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TRIAL TACTICS

Rule 404(b) and Reversal
on Appeal
BY STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG

I

f hard cases make bad law, strange cases sometimes
produce surprising appellate decisions. One strange
case that illustrates the point is United States v. Bell,
516 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 2008). The case began with a domestic violence call to the police, led to a consent search
of a home and discovery of drugs and guns, and produced
a conviction of Brian Bell on drug and weapons charges.
Despite the abuse of discretion standard of review and
the usual deference appellate courts give to trial judge
decisions with respect to the admissibility of uncharged
crime evidence, the court of appeals reversed.

The Facts
The case began on February 23, 2004, in Cordova,
Tennessee, when Shelby County Deputy Sheriff Walter Blaylock responded to a domestic violence complaint concerning Bell and 14-year-old Amber WilNoting that the child was crying and displayed signs
of physical injury, Blaylock arrested Bell, searched
him, and found a bag of marijuana and $1,852 in
cash. Blaylock secured Bell and escorted Williams
inside her house to telephone her mother, April Armstrong, who was at school. Inside the house, Blaylock
observed marijuana and drug paraphernalia, including scales, a cutting board, and baggies on a table.
Armstrong arrived home and gave her consent to
Blaylock to search the house. Blaylock found more
than 11 kilograms of marijuana packaged in small
arms, assorted ammunition, a large digital scale, bags
of cigar “blunts” commonly used to smoke marijuana,
The government charged Bell with three crimes:
(1) possession of 11,071.1 grams of marijuana with
intent to distribute, (2) possession of 94.6 grams of
crack cocaine with intent to distribute, and (3) poswas tried before a jury.
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, immediate pastchair of the Criminal Justice Section, is
the Wallace and Beverley Woodbury University Professor at George Washington
University School of Law in Washington,
D.C., and a contributing editor to Criminal Justice magazine.

Conflicting Testimony
mother at the house where the drugs and guns were
found and Bell stayed there “three or four nights
out of the week.” He had his own room, she stated,
where he kept personal belongings such as his pit
bull dogs, his clothes, his cologne, and his backpack,
and he housed his Lexus in the garage. Williams also
had resided in the house in the month during which
Blaylock made his search.
Armstrong largely corroborated her daughter’s
testimony, stating that while Bell was “in and out” he
“lived there most of the time.” He assisted in paying
the bills for the residence, she said, and shared her
to the entire house and she agreed with her daughter
that Bell had his own room where he stored his belongings. Occasionally, she stated, Bell had visitors
to the house. Armstrong denied that the drugs and
guns Blaylock found were hers.
and her seven-year-old son in Memphis, Tennessee,
and stayed with her “[b]asically every night” and
was only gone about “two nights out of the week.”
Johnson added that Bell told her that when he was
not with her he would stay at his aunt’s home.
Thus, at the conclusion of the government’s casetestimony as to whether Bell spent most of his time
in Cordova or Memphis, and whether he essentially
lived with Armstrong or with Johnson. If the jury
were to believe Johnson, the prosecution’s claim
have been weakened, as Bell’s connection with the
house in which the evidence was found would have
been attenuated.
Bell did not testify on his own behalf, probably
because he had prior convictions that might well
have been admitted to impeach him and do substantial damage to the defense. Those convictions
sulted in the reversal on appeal.

Whose Drugs and Guns?
At the conclusion of the defense case, it appears that
there are several possible answers to the question of
who possessed the drugs and guns:
1. They belonged to Bell, and neither Williams
nor Armstrong shared the possession.
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2. They belonged to Bell, and either Williams or
Armstrong or both shared the possession.
3. They belonged to Bell and other associates
of Bell, and neither Williams nor Armstrong
shared the possession.
4. They belonged to Bell and other associates of
Bell, and either Williams or Armstrong or both
shared the possession.
5. They belonged to Williams alone.
6. They belonged to Armstrong alone.
7. Williams and Armstrong shared possession.
8. They belonged to an associate of Williams
and neither Williams nor Armstrong shared
possession.
9. They belonged to an associate of Williams, and
either Williams or Armstrong or both shared
possession.
10. They belonged to an associate of Armstrong,
and neither Williams nor Armstrong shared
possession.
11. They belonged to an associate of Armstrong,
and either Williams or Armstrong or both
shared possession.
12. None of the above.
Given the fact that the drugs and drug paraphernalia were in plain view, explanation 12 seems unexplanations were true, and not guilty if any of the
explanations from 5-12 were true. By eliciting from
Armstrong a denial that the drugs and guns were
hers and relying on Williams’s testimony, the government made the strategic decision at trial to rely
on explanations 1 or 3 to prove guilt.

The Rule 404(b) Fight
Prior to the trial, the government moved in limine to
admit Bell’s four prior drug convictions: (1) an October 16, 1997, conviction for possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute; (2) an October 16, 1997, conviction for possession of cocaine base with intent to
distribute; (3) a June 18, 1999, conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute; and (4) a
June 18, 1999, conviction for possession of cocaine
base with intent to distribute. The government argued
that the evidence tended to prove knowledge, intent,
and absence of mistake or accident. The trial judge
deferred a ruling, and the government renewed its
motion at the conclusion of the defense case.
The trial judge addressed the three issues that
that the acts underlying the convictions occurred? Is

the evidence admissible for a permissible purpose?
Does the prejudicial effect substantially outweigh
the probative value?
the judge turned to the second question and reasoned
as follows:
The second issue deals not only with whether
or not [the convictions] can be proved, but
whether they—whether the government has articulated an appropriate basis under 404(b) for
the admission of such type—such evidence, in
other words, whether or not they have submitand based upon the court’s review of the record
as to whether or not one or more of the permitted admissibility bases is present. . . . I think
it’s cited in [United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d
1253 (6th Cir. 1985)] and [United States v. Lattner, 385 F.3d 947 (6th Cir. 2004)] that, when
the defendant in such a charge enters a plea of
not guilty, basically he is putting every element,
including the intent aspect, to the government’s
proof. And, as well, the court believes that the
defendant’s position in this case has been that he
was not aware, he was—he did not know these
drugs were there or they were planted by someone else, put in there by somebody else, you
know, that this was simply he just happened to
be—he was an innocent person in terms of their
being present or it was a mistake or an accident
or just happened to be there.
I think under the circumstances of what I’ve heard
from the proof, is that the government’s submission of this evidence would go towards the issue
of intent and absence of mistake or accident.
(516 F.3d at 438.)
The judge struck the Rule 403 balance in favor of
the government, admitted the evidence, and gave a
limiting instruction to the jury:
Ladies and gentlemen, the court has permitted the
introduction of testimony—or evidence, rather,
here regarding the defendant, Mr. Bell, about committing—the commission of other crimes other
than the ones that are charged in the indictment.
these acts, these crimes, you can consider the evidence only as it relates to the government’s claim
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on the defendant’s intent or absence of mistake or
absence of accident. You may not consider it for
any other purpose. And I’ll give this instruction to
But remember and keep this in mind, that the defendant is on trial here only for the offenses that
he is charged with in this indictment, which again
I will read to you. So the burden still remains on
the government to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and, again, the defendant is not on trial
for any previous act, but only for those that are
charged here in this indictment.
(Id.)
After the closing arguments, the judge gave a
similar instruction before the jury was dismissed:
Now, you heard testimony that the defendant
committed crimes other than the ones charged
did these crimes, you can consider the evidence
only as it relates to the government’s claim on
the defendant’s intent, absence of mistake, or
absence of accident. You must not consider it
for any other purpose. Now, remember that the
defendant is on trial here for only those charges
in the indictment and not for the other acts. Do
not return a guilty verdict unless the government proves the crime charged in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Id.)
The jury found Bell guilty on all three counts.

The Court of Appeals Majority
The court of appeals reversed Bell’s convictions by
a 2-1 vote. The majority concluded that “the district
court erred in admitting the evidence of Bell’s prior
drug convictions for the purpose of demonstrating absence of mistake or accident and intent, and
value of this evidence on the issue of intent was not
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact.
Because this error was not harmless, Bell is entitled
to a new trial.” (Id. at 441.)
mistake or accident. It reasoned as follows:
Absence of mistake or accident is one of the
permissible purposes listed in Rule 404(b).
However, “the government’s purpose in introducing the evidence must be to prove a fact

that the defendant has placed, or conceivably
will place, in issue, or a fact that the statutory
elements obligate the government to prove.”
[United States v.] Merriweather, 78 F.3d at
[1070] 1076 [(6th Cir. 1996)]. Thus, for other
acts evidence to be admissible for the purpose
of showing absence of mistake or accident,
the defendant must assert a defense based on
some type of mistake or accident. See United
States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 606 (6th Cir.
permissible purpose, in a felon in possession
case, when the defendant’s only defense was
that the gun was not his and that he did not
know that it was under his seat); United States
v. Ward, 190 F.3d 483, 489 (6th Cir. 1999) (rejecting absence of mistake as a permissible
purpose for the admission of evidence when
the defendant’s “defense was not that she mistakenly thought she was selling powdered sugar instead of cocaine”); Merriweather, 78 F.3d
at 1077 (noting that “absence of mistake ‘on
behalf of the government’ is not a legitimate
basis to admit other acts evidence”).
The district court erred in concluding that the
evidence of Bell’s prior convictions was admissible for the purpose of demonstrating absence of mistake or accident. This case did not
present an issue of mistake or accident. Bell’s
argument was not that he was mistaken about
the narcotic nature of the substances seized by
the police, but rather that he never possessed
the marijuana and crack cocaine. The district
court recognized that there was “no indication
from [Bell’s] arguments or anything that has
been put on that would indicate that Mr. Bell
knew something was there, but didn’t know it
was drugs.” On the contrary, the district court
believed Bell’s position to be that “he did not
know these drugs were there or they were
planted by someone else, put in there by somebody else, [that] he was an innocent person in
terms of their being present or it was a mistake
or accident or just happened to be there.” In
other words, Bell was claiming that it was a
mistake for the police to think that the drugs
were his, not that he was mistaken about the
fact that the substances found were drugs. As
Bell “never claimed that he was unknowingly
dealing in cocaine or was unwittingly engaging in unlawful activity,” the evidence of his
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prior drug convictions could not be properly
admitted for the purpose of absence of mistake
or accident. Merriweather, 78 F.3d at 1077.
(Id. at 442.)
In short, the court found that there was no defense
claim, implicit or explicit, that Bell claimed that the
drugs and guns were present as a result of his mistake
or accident. His defense was that they were not his
drugs, he was not living in the house where they were
found, and he did not know they were there. Therefore, the government’s rebuttal addressed an issue not
in the case. The court of appeals deemed this legal error
rather than abuse of discretion, since the trial judge has
no discretion to admit evidence that is irrelevant.
The court had a different view of the admissibility
of the prior convictions to prove intent and wrote as follows: “Proving intent . . . was a potentially legitimate
reason for the government to offer evidence of Bell’s
strating a defendant’s intent as a permissible purpose.
Moreover, Bell’s intent to possess and distribute was at
issue because it is an element that the government must
prove to establish possession with intent to distribute.
. . . Accordingly, the district court properly found that
the evidence was being offered for the admissible purpose of intent and that this purpose was at issue in the
case.” (Id. at 442-43.) Having found that the purpose
was limited, the court added that, “whether the evidence of Bell’s prior drug convictions was probative
on the issue of intent is a closer question.” (Id. at 443.)
The court answered the question as follows:
To determine if evidence of other acts is probative of intent, we look to whether the evidence relates to conduct that is “substantially
similar and reasonably near in time” to the
have drawn a distinction between the probative value of prior acts of personal drug use
and prior acts of drug distribution
former not to be probative of intent to possess
and distribute. . . .
Likewise, while we have repeatedly recognized
that prior drug distribution evidence is admissible
to show intent to distribute, our cases have only
found such evidence probative of present intent
to possess and distribute when the prior distributions were part of the same scheme or involved
a similar modus operandi as the present offense
. . . . Unless the past and present crime are related

by being part of the same scheme of drug distribution or by having the same modus operandi,
the fact that a defendant has intended to possess
and distribute drugs in the past does not logically
compel the conclusion that he presently intends to
possess and distribute drugs. . . . Indeed, a person
may be a distributor of drugs on one occasion, and
a mere user on another. The only way to reach the
conclusion that the person currently has the intent
to possess and distribute based solely on evidence
of unrelated prior convictions for drug distribution
is by employing the very kind of reasoning—i.e.,
once a drug dealer, always a drug dealer—which
404(b) excludes. . . . Thus, to be probative of a defendant’s present intent to possess and distribute,
his prior convictions for drug distribution must
be related in some way to the present crime for
which the defendant is on trial.
Here, Bell’s prior convictions were for unlawful
possession of cocaine and marijuana with intent
to distribute, the same type of charges at issue in
this case. However, the convictions were for offenses that occurred several years previously and
were not alleged to be part of the same scheme
to distribute drugs or to involve a similar modus
operandi. Such evidence of prior distribution,
unconnected to the present charge, is not probative of whether Bell intended to possess and distribute drugs in the instant case. Accordingly, the
prior convictions admissible for the legitimate
purpose of proving Bell’s intent.
(Id. at 443-44; citations omitted.)
The court found that not only did the trial judge err in
admitting the convictions to prove intent, the judge
also abused discretion in the Rule 403 analysis:
Despite the substantial deference that must be
afforded a lower court’s Rule 403 balancing
its discretion in the instant case. We have already noted that the evidence of Bell’s prior
convictions was not probative of his present
intent to possess and distribute, the only plausibly legitimate purpose for offering this evidence. However, even assuming that this evidence would have some probative value on the
issue of intent, its value would be slight. Bell’s
prior distribution of drugs several years prior
to the instant offense does not necessarily im-
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ply that he was intending to possess and distribute drugs on this occasion. The only way
that such evidence would be probative is if the
jury were permitted to infer that because Bell
has distributed drugs in the past, it is likely
that he was doing so in the present case. Yet,
this is the very kind of propensity reasoning
which Rule 404(b) prohibits the jury from using in assessing the probative value of Bell’s
prior convictions and prevents the judge from
considering when engaging in the Rule 403
balancing process.
(Id. at 445-46.)
The court also found that the trial judge did not
adequately consider the other evidence of intent to
distribute that the government possessed, including
paraphernalia, and did not appropriately appreciate
the weak additional probative value of the convictions and the much more probable prejudice arising from the fact that “the evidence of Bell’s prior
crimes painted a picture of Bell as a repeat drug offender, greatly increasing the chance that the jury
would punish him not for his involvement in the offense at issue, but rather because he appeared to be a
‘bad’ guy.” (Id. at 446.)
The court found that the trial judge’s limiting instructions did little to ameliorate the prejudice and
may have exacerbated the prejudice:
These instructions did remind the jury that
Bell was on trial only for the charged offenses
and not for his prior bad acts. However, by directing the jury to consider these acts for the
purpose of ascertaining Bell’s intent, the court
was implicitly approving the kind of reasoning
which would suggest that because Bell was a
drug distributor in the past, the jury should
consider him to have distributed drugs in the
present case. Moreover, the court’s instruction
created the possibility for an even greater prejudicial impact by directing the jury to consider
the evidence of Bell’s prior convictions for the
purpose of absence of mistake, a matter which
was not even at issue in the case.
(Id. at 446-47.)

The Dissent
Judge Steeh dissented and argued that the government was required to prove Bell’s general intent to
knowingly and intentionally possess the drugs and

guns and concluded that the prior convictions were
admissible to prove that Bell did not possess them
by mistake or accident. The dissent also argued
in issue as well as general intent. Since there was
evidence that Bell resided at the residence where the
drugs and guns were found, the dissent concluded
that the evidence was admissible to prove knowledge and intent and to negate the possibility that the
drugs and guns were present by accident.

The Lessons
1. The majority highlights the fact that a defendant
who claims not to have been present where the drugs
and guns were found is not raising a defense of mistake or accident. The dissent urges that, by pleading
not guilty, Bell required the government to prove
knowledge and intent, so that, if the jury believed
Williams and Armstrong, the government still had
to prove that Bell knowingly and intentionally possessed the drugs and guns. The majority’s response
is that, if the jury believed that Bell was the source of
the drugs and guns, it surely would conclude in light
of the quantity and circumstances that he knowingly
and intentionally possessed them and intended to
distribute the drugs. In sum, the majority insists on
focusing on the actual defense and the need for government proof to respond to that defense.
2. The reality in this case is that the only question
the jury really had to decide was “whose drugs and
guns were they?” The danger in admission of the prior
convictions is that the jury would decide that the drugs
belonged to Bell because he was a repeat offender. This
is predisposition use and is barred by Rule 404(b).
3. One aspect of the case that makes it strange
is that the crucial testimony related to whether Bell
actually lived in the home where the guns and drugs
were found. It is not possible that Williams and
Armstrong were truthful and accurate if Johnson’s
testimony was crucial and accurate. The converse is
also true. If the jury disbelieved Williams and Armgovernment’s case was indeed weak. If Williams
and Armstrong were not truthful, it could have been
because they were involved with Bell, were themselves guilty without Bell’s involvement, or were
involved with others. Bell’s prior convictions would
have provided no guidance as to which of these possibilities is most likely. The prior convictions simply branded Bell as the kind of man who would deal
drugs, and this use of the convictions does seem improper under Rule 404(b). ■
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